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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee First Madison Services, Inc. ("First Madison") does not dispute tk*
Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78A-4-103(2)(j) to review
the final order made by the District Courl which dismissed Beverly Mast's ("Mast")
Complaint against First Madison for failing to state a claim for relief

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court a wnx\ h rule on I' irst Madison's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

to Dismiss Mast's claims against First Madison?
a.

Was the Trial Court correct, as a matter of law, in determining that:
1) Mast's claims for damages under RESPA were time barred; and,
2) First Madison satisfied its duty under RESPA §2605(b) to provide
Mast with timely notice of the transfer of servicing of 1 I cr 1 <»: 111 Lo
Litton Loan Servicing, L.P.

i).

Did Mast property preserve the issue of whether she should have

been allowed to amend her Complaint to assert a claim lot < H 1111tin \
negligence against First Madison?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ARule 12(b)(6) dismissal is ;J i-nivN'sion ofhm, -md as such, this Court reviews
that conclusion for correctness. Medvedv. Glenn, 2004 UT App 61, f l

1

I in I rial court is

justified in its dismissal of a case under Rule 12(b)(6) when, assuming the facts of the
Complaint are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
Mast, the allegations of the Complaint clearly show that Mast does not have a claim
against First Madison. Id; see also, Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
This Court "review[s] the grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion for correctness, ceding
no deference to the district court." Oakwood Vill LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,
P 9, 104 P.3d 1226; Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Atk Common, 2007 UT 99, f8 (Utah 2007).
Moreover, to the extent that the trial court interpreted "prior precedent, statutes, and the
common law" in making its decision to dismiss, these are questions of law that are
reviewed for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, | 6 (Utah 2007).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6):
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:... (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.... If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
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Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §2605(b) {See Appellant's Brief,
Attachment E, Pl.fs Ex.7)
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §2614:
Sec. 2614. Jurisdiction of courts; limitations
Any action pursuant to the provisions of section 2605, 2607, or 2608
of this title may be brought in the United States district court or in
any other court of competent jurisdiction, for the district in which the
property involved is located, or where the violation is alleged to have
occurred, within 3 years in the case of a violation of section 2605 of
this title and 1 year in the case of a violation of section 2607 or 2608
of this title from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except
that actions brought by the Secretary, the Attorney General of any
State, or the insurance commissioner of any State may be brought within 3 years
from the date of the occurrence of the violation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellant Beverly Mast had seven years of periodic defaults under her mortgage
loan and then under her forbearance agreements. As a result, Mast's home was sold at a
foreclosure sale on July 16, 2002. (R. 5, 13, 1679.) On April 22, 2003, Mast filed a
federal action for essentially the same claims as asserted in the present case. The federal
court dismissed the complaint on December 15, 2003. (R. 43.) Mast then filed her
Complaint in the Third District Court on December 30, 2003 in which she named several
defendants, including First Madison. Mast asserted certain notice violations under
RESPA, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA") against First Madison. (R. 1-34.) All claims against First Madison
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were dismissed with prejudice. (R. 471.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below as Related to First Madison.

First Madison responded to the Complaint with a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 271-283.) The Trial Court granted First Madison's Motion
to Dismiss in its entirety with prejudice, concluding that Mast's claims for damages under
RESPA, FDCPA and FHA were all time barred (R. 469-471; 485-487.) Further, the
Trial Court determined that First Madison's duty under RESPA §2605(b) was only to
provide timely notice to Mast of the transfer of the servicing of her loan to Litton Loan
Servicing, L.P., and Mast acknowledged that First Madison satisfied that duty in a timely
manner. (R. 470.)
First Madison took no further part in the litigation after it was dismissed from the
suit, with prejudice. However, on January 7, 2008, Mast filed her Notice of Appeal on
"all of thefinaljudgments and orders of the various judges assigned to this case,
including the court's discovery orders, and the denial of Plaintiff[sic] Rule 59 Motion,
decided on December, 7, 2007." (R. 1664-1665)(emphasis added.)
C.

Additional Facts Relevant to Issues Presentedfor Review.

1.

First Madison (fka Clayton National, Inc.) was the servicer of Mast's HUD

loan through November 2000. (R. 16, ^[84, R. 17, ^|94.)
2.

During the period June 1995 through November 2000 when HUD itself and

then First Madison serviced Mast's loan, Mast entered into at least six forbearance
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agreements. By those agreements, Mast's payments were reduced to assist her in bringing
her loan current and to avoid foreclosure. (R. 5, ffl[16-17.)
3.

In or about September 2000, HUD entered into a Loan Sale Agreement with

defendant Salomon Brothers. (R. 6, ^23-24) (Alleging that the loan was sold either in
June or September 2000, and further, that "it was discovered from Clayton's records that
the loan was allegedly sold in September 2000.")
4.

The Agreement provided for the sale of a bundle of loans, including Mast's

loan, and Mast's Note was transferred to Salomon. (R. 5, ^[20, R. 6,1J23.)
5.

The Assignment of Trust Deed was not executed until June 2001 and was

recorded in July 2001. (R. 6, ^23.)
6.

On or about November 15, 2000, First Madison delivered a letter to Mast

notifying her that effective December 1, 2000, the servicing of her loan would be
transferred to defendant Litton. (R. 16, |84, R. ^[94) (stating that the November 15 letter
indicatecl an effective date of December 1, 2000). The servicing of the loan was
transferred to Litton effective December 1, 2000.
7.

On April 22, 2003, Mast filed an action against the same Defendants-

Appellees in federal court for the District of Utah, Civ. No. 2:03-CV-00391DB. The
other named defendants filed motions to dismiss which were granted by Judge Dee
Benson, and the order of dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety was signed December
15,2003. Mast filed this action in state court on or about December 30,2003. (R. 1-37,
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43.)
8.

After the action was filed in the trial court, Firs Madison moved to dismiss

the claims against it under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 271-283.)
9.

The Complaint filed made no allegations of ordinary negligence under state

law against First Madison. (R. 1-37.)
10.

Contrary to her assertion in her Opening Brief, Mast made no request of the

Trial Court to amend her Complaint to assert ordinary negligence under state law. "In
this matter leave to amend is believed to be unnecessary at this time against [First
Madison]." (R. 320.) She did, however, request to amend her Complaint if she
developed information relating to her Fair Housing claim, and she was provided the
opportunity to amend her Complaint in that regard; however, she declined to do so. (R.
323, R. 471.)
11.

Mast did not seek reconsideration or review of the Order of Dismissal, nor

has she ever sought relief or appeal from the Order by motion, or on an interlocutory
basis.
12.

First Madison has had no involvement in any aspect of the case whatsoever

beyond its participation with regard to its Motion to Dismiss. (R. 271-283, R. 379-384,
R. 394-395, R. 442, R. 463-4723, R. 485-497.) First Madison never filed nor was it
required to file an Answer in the case, nor did it participate in any discovery.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court did not err when, under the facts alleged by Mast in her Complaint
and in light of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, it concluded that
there was no plausible way that First Madison could be held liable to Mast under the
claims alleged and dismissed the Complaint against it. First Madison owed no duty to
Mast beyond providing her with written notice of the transfer of the servicing of her loan,
which notice Masts acknowledges she received in a timely manner. Count III of Mast's
Complaint against First Madison was dismissed on this basis. Further, Mast's claims for
damages against First Madison under RESPA are time barred and were dismissed on that
basis.
Mast argues that she should have been allowed discovery on her RESPA claims, or
at least an opportunity to amend her Complaint to allege ordinary negligence under state
law. However, Mast made no effort to seek amendment of the Complaint, to set aside the
Court's decision, or to seek relief from it once discovery was underway. Further, Mast
made no effort to assert a claim for ordinary negligence under state law, and as such, she
failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Moreover, Mast cannot establish emotional
distress damages as a result of the alleged negligence, and as such, her claim must fail as
a matter of law. Her claims against First Madison were properly dismissed, with
prejudice.
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ARGUMENT
The facts alleged in Mast's Complaint are presumed true for purposes of a Rule
12(b)(6) Motion. However, if it clearly appears that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts
which would entitle her to relief, Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed. Colman v. Utah
State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); see also, Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d
1081 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). "On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we review the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint."
SonyElecs., Inc. v. Reber, 2004 UT App 420, P10 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)(citations
omitted). Based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint, and the applicable law, there are
no set of facts which Plaintiff can prove which would entitle her to relief against First
Madison.
I.

Plaintiff Claims Against First Madison Were Properly Dismissed.

The Trial Court dismissed Mast's RESPA claims against First Madison for two
reasons: 1) the claims were time barred; and 2) First Madison, as the transferor under
RESPA §2605(b), complied with its duty under RESPA to provide Mast timely written
notice of the transfer of servicing of her loan to defendant-appellee Litton Loan
Servicing, L.P. (R. 469-471.)
A.

Mast's Claims for Damages Under RESPA are Time Barred.

RESPA imposes a three year statute of limitations on Mast's claims for damages.
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") provides for its own statute of
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limitations for claims for damages brought under Section 2605 of the title. "[A]ny action
pursuant to the provisions of section 2605 . . . of this title may be brought... within 3
years in the case of a violation of section 2605 of this title . . . from the date of the
occurrence of the violation." 12 U.S.C. §2614 (emphasis added).
If a "complaint shows on its face the existence of an affirmative defense, the
complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See, Tucker v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, |10. Mast's Complaint alleges facts and
dates which clearly establish that her damages claims under RESPA against First
Madison are time barred. For instance, in Count I of her First Cause of Action, Plaintiff
alleges that First Madison violated the notice provisions of Section 2605(b)(1) by failing
to "provide Plaintiff of timely notice of the purported June-September 2000 sale to
Salomon." (R. 15, ^76.) Thus, according to Plaintiff, First Madison's alleged violation
occurred - at the latest - in September 2000. Plaintiff did not bring her claims, however,
until December 30,2003, more than three years after the alleged violation. Pursuant to
Section 2614 of RESPA, Plaintiffs claims set forth in Count I of her First Cause of
Action are time barred and were correctly dismissed.
Similarly, in Count II of her First Cause of Action, Mast alleges that First Madison
failed in its duty to provide her with timely notice of the assignment of Mast's loan to
defendant-appellee Litton. Plaintiff alleges that First Madison's November 15, 2000
notice "failed to indicate a July date - the date Litton commenced loan servicing." (R. 16,
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Tff 83-86.) Thus, First Madison's alleged violation occurred in November 2000, more than
three years before Plaintiff brought her action for damages under RESPA §2605. Count
II of Plaintiff s First Cause of Action against First Madison is also time barred and was
correctly dismissed. (R. 470-471.)
1.

The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply Here to Salvage Mast's Claims.

The Trial Court dismissed Mast's claims against First Madison in part as a
result of the claims being untimely under RESPA's three year statute of limitations. 12
U.S.C. §2614. Mast suggests in her Opening Brief that the statute of limitations
contained in §2614 should be tolled for the period November 2000 through March 2001
because she did not "even become aware of [First Madison's] negligence until March
2001." (Opening Brief, at 6, of record herein.) The three year limitations period did not
expire until November 2003; however, Mast did not file her Complaint until December
30, 2003. It is clear that Mast knew of the alleged conduct at least as of March 2001, well
within the three year statute of limitations period under RESPA.
The equitable discovery rule operates to "toll a statute of limitations until the time
at which a party discovered or reasonably should have discovered Tacts forming the basis
for the cause of action."' Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, P36 (Utah 2008). However,
where there is evidence to show that a party knew or had reason to know of the events
giving rise to her claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the equitable
discovery rule does not apply as a matter of law. Id., at ^[39. Here, Mast has
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acknowledged that she knew of the events giving rise to a claim of ordinary negligence
prior to the expiration of the three year statute of limitations. As such, the equitable
discovery rule is not applicable m these circumstances as a matter of law and the Trial
Court's decision was correct.
B.

RESPA §2605(b) Only Requires Notice of the Transfer of Servicing of a
Loan, Which Duty First Madison Timely Satisfied.

Section 2605(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 USC
§2601, et seq. provides certain notice requirements by which a loan servicer must abide
with regard to the transfer of servicing of a federally protected loan such as Plaintiffs
HUD loan. In relevant part it states, "(1) Notice requirement... Each servicer of any
federally related mortgage loan shall notify the borrower in writing of any assignment,
sale or transfer of the servicing of the loan to any other person." 12 U.S.C. §2605(b)
(emphasis added). However, in her Complaint, Mast alleges that First Madison violated
Section 2605(b) of RESPA by failing to provide her with notice of the sale of the loan by
HUD to Salomon. (R. 6, f24; R. 14-15,ffl[73-79;R. 322.)

Contrary to Mast's

interpretation, Section 2605(b)(1) relates only to a change in servicing of a loan through
sale, assignment or transfer. It does not refer to the sale, assignment or transfer of the
loan itself. See also, 24 C.F.R. §3500.21(d). Instructive on this point is the heading of
Section 2605(b): "Notice by transferor of loan servicing at time of transfer" 12 U.S.C.
§2605(b)(emphasis added). Also instructive is the subsequent section 2606(b)(2)(A),
which states that the notice required under section 2605(b)(1) must "be made to the
11

borrower not less than 15 days before the effective date of transfer of the servicing of the
mortgage loan (with respect to which such notice is made)." 12 U.S.C. §2605(b)(2)(A).
The purpose of the required notice is to inform the borrower of any change in the
servicing of her loan and of the effective date of such changes in service. See e.g., 24
C.F.R. §3500.21(d) (indicating that certain transfers are not considered "an assignment,
sale or transfer of mortgage loan servicing for purposes of [the notice] requirement if
there is no change in the payee, address to which payment must be delivered, account
number, or amount of payment due").
On November 15, 2000, First Madison complied with Section 2605(b) by
providing written notice to Mast of the transfer in the servicing of her loan to Litton not
less than fifteen days prior to the effective date of transfer. Mast acknowledges that
timely notice was provided to her by First Madison. (R. 16, ^[84; R. 17,1f94.)
Nonetheless, Mast sought to extend First Madison's RESPA notice obligations as a loan
servicer to providing notice of a sale of the loan, even though First Madison did not own
the loan and its only relationship to the loan was as its servicer. RESPA does not impose
that obligation upon First Madison. Further, First Madison was not obligated to provide
written notice of the transfer of servicing to Litton any sooner than fifteen days before the
effective date of the transfer. (Cf., R. 14-17, Counts I, II of First Cause of Action of
Complaint.) Even assuming the veracity of the facts alleged in Mast's Complaint,
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under Section 2605(b) of RESPA, and her claims
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were properly dismissed against First Madison.

II. MAST FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE
Mast failed to present the issue of amending her Complaint to include a claim for
ordinary negligence to the Trial Court. As such, the Trial Court did not have an
opportunity to rule on the issue. Consequently, Mast failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. "Generally, fin order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'"
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, |15 (Utah 2007)(citations omitted). Mast specifically did
not present to the Trial Court the issue of amending her Complaint to include a claim for
ordinary negligence. On the contrary, when she opposed First Madison's Motion to
Dismiss, Mast clearly represented to the Trial Court that, "In this matter leave to amend is
believed to be unnecessary at this time against [First Madison].55 (R. 320.)
The two record cites Ma^t provides as to her preservation of the Issue (No. 2, in
her Opening Brief) do not actually reference Mast's seeking of an opportunity to amend
her Complaint. (See Opening Brief, at 2; R. 324, R. 471.) Page 324 of the Record
references only Mast's desire to present a conspiracy claim to a jury for an alleged scheme
between First Madison and Litton to convert Mast's loan to a conventional loan and then
to allegedly foreclose the loan outside of HUD's forbearance policy. (R. 324.) There is
no mention whatsoever of ordinary negligence or of Mast's desire to amend her
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Complaint to assert an ordinary negligence claim.1 Similarly, Page 471 of the Record is
the last page of the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision on the defendants1 motions to
dismiss, and it makes no reference to Mast's assertion that she sought to amend her
Complaint to include a claim for ordinary negligence. On the contrary, the Trial Court
references only Mast's argument that she be allowed to amend her complaint as to her
claims under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") should she discover other relevant dates
which would render her FHA claims timely. (R. 471.) Mast never availed herself of that
opportunity.
There are three factors that help this Court determine whether Mast preserved the
issue for appeal so as to provide the Trial Court an opportunity to rule on the issue of
whether Mast should be allowed to amend her Complaint to assert a claim of ordinary
negligence: '"(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority.'" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 15 (Utah 2007). Mast cannot satisfy these three factors.
The issuje of amending her Complaint to include a claim for ordinary negligence was first
raised on appeal, and is therefore untimely. (Opening Brief, at 2.) Even if Mast asserts
that the issue was raised with the Trial Court, it was not specifically raised, and as such, it
1

Similarly, in her Objection to the Proposed Order Granting First Madison's
Motion to Dismiss, Mast states only that "upon revelation of additional claims of
discovery . . . . Plaintiff should not be barred from amending her complaint even for
conspiracy claims, if appropriate." (R. 489.) She makes no mention of ordinary
negligence.
14

was not properly preserved. (R. 324, R. 471.) Finally, Mast failed to present supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority to the Trial Court on the issue of ordinary negligence
sufficient to provide the Trial Court an opportunity to rule on the issue of whether Mast
should be allowed a chance to amend her Complaint. Under Utah law, Mast failed to
properly preserve the issue for appeal, and the Trial Court's decision should be deemed
correct as a matter of law.
A.

Even if Mast Preserved the Issue, She Cannot Establish a Prima Facie
Claim for Negligence.

In order to make out a claim for ordinary negligence, Mast must show that she
suffered damages as a proximate result of the alleged negligent conduct. Mast asserts she
suffered emotional distress damages as a result of First Madison's alleged negligent
transfer of her loan - specifically, Mast asserts that First Madison failed to transfer certain
payments she made during the period August 200 to November 2000. The evidence
presented at trial illustrates that the harm Mast suffered was as a result of the foreclosure
of her house, and not as a result of any alleged conduct of First Madison. (R. 1679-80.)
At the time of the transfer of the loan, it was determined that in fact, Mast was delinquent
on her payments. (R. 1679.) Moreover, the foreclosure of Mast's home occurred as a
result of her failure to keep current on her payments for the year and a half when Litton
was servicing her loan. (R. 1679.) Mast simply cannot establish a nexus between First
Madison's allegedly negligent conduct and the emotional distress she suffered as a result
of the foreclosure of her home. As such, she cannot establish a claim for negligence, and
15

the dismissal of her claims against First Madison was appropriate as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, the Trial Court's decision to
dismiss all of Mast's claims against First Madison with prejudice should be affirmed.
DATED this 24th day of December. 2008.
LAW OFFICE OF ELIZABETH M. PECK
By:
Elizabeth M. Pecf
Attorney for First Madison Services, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by first class mail, postage prepaid, a
true ad correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE FIRST MADISON
SERVICES, INC. To the following:

Orson B. West, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
180 So. 300 West, Ste. 215
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Darryl J. Lee
WOOD CRAPO
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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